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SINGLE-SUBJECT CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS 
 
RICHARD ALBERT† 
  
Abstract 
 
What makes a constitution difficult to amend? The answer varies across jurisdictions. In the 
United States, for example, the threshold problem is getting two-thirds of Congress to initiate an 
amendment—a virtually impossibility in our present day given that Congress has a hard enough 
time agreeing by a simple majority to pass a simple law. In Australia and Switzerland, it is largely 
the combination of subnational approval and referendal ratification that complicates matters. In 
Canada—the subject of this paper—constitutional amendment difficulty derives from similar 
challenges associated with initiation and ratification but perhaps even more from the use of 
omnibus amendment bills that combine the good with the bad and give political actors as much a 
reason to vote in favour as to vote against. In this paper prepared for a symposium on “Rewriting 
the Canadian Constitution,” I suggest that amending the Constitution of Canada could become 
easier under a new single-subject rule that prohibits omnibus amendment bills but permits multiple 
single-amendment bills only if voted on separately and differentiated by subject-matter. Imposing 
a single-subject rule for constitutional amendments in Canada is likely to make the Constitution 
much more flexible in some important ways but perhaps much more rigid in others. 
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INTRODUCTION—THE MOST DIFFICULT CONSTITUTION TO AMEND? 
 
In the leading study of constitutional rigidity, Donald Lutz deliberately excludes Canada from 
his 32-country sample.1 In a footnote, he explains why: “the problem,” he writes, “lies in 
determining what has constitutional status.”2 In other words, Lutz has trouble identifying what 
counts in Canada as constitutional as opposed to ordinary law. There are many reasons for Lutz 
uncertainty about the Constitution: its self-consciously partially codified and uncodified nature; 
the mid-stream entrenchment of the country’s first comprehensive amending formula in 1982, over 
a century after the creation of Confederation; and the question whether any unwritten constitutional 
norm has ever been altered by statute or amendment. Notwithstanding these conceptual challenges 
to measuring the precise quantum of formal amendment difficulty in Canada, modern history has 
taught us that amendments in the mold of the Meech Lake or Charlottetown Accords are doomed 
to fail, making the Canadian Constitution virtually unamendable for large-scale reforms.3 
 
Stasis need not be the fate of the Constitution of Canada, and of course it remains in constant 
evolution through constitutional interpretation and political practice.4 And although major formal 
reforms have in the past failed but they might well succeed in the future if political actors use a 
new approach to how they propose constitutional amendments. From Patriation through the Meech 
Lake and Charlottetown Accords, political actors have taken to packaging their proposed 
alterations to the Canadian Constitution as an omnibus amendment bill that merges all manner of 
changes into one single constitutional amendment. There are advantages to this strategy: it makes 
possible enormous constitutional transformations that improve democratic procedures and 
strengthen rights; it allows many if not all constituencies to get something they demand; and it 
avoids the risk inherent in incrementalist sequencing that relies on the continuing good faith of 
political actors to make good on promises to address substantial problems in a piecemeal fashion. 
Yet there is great peril in this strategy: an omnibus amendment bill is a house of cards built on 
what may be a weak foundation. Pulling one card from its place destroys the entire edifice. The 
more there is to vote against in a package, the less likely it is to make it through the veto gates that 
line the way toward the successful ratification of a constitutional amendment in Canada. 
 
In this paper, I suggest that the amending formula should amended to limit future constitutional 
amendments to a single-subject rule. In contrast to an omnibus amendment bill that packages many 
amendments together as one amendment—especially where those changes are unrelated to each 
other except insofar as they all concern the Canadian Constitution—a single-subject rule would 
prevent the use of an omnibus bill for constitutional amendment and would instead require political 
actors to propose individual amendments that focus on one subject alone. Under this new rule, 
political actors would be compelled to propose amendments embracing only one subject and to 
consider every single amendment on its own merits, with a distinguishable vote on each proposed 
change. This new single-subject rule would be inserted into Part V of the Constitution Act, 1982 
and would require that “no amendment shall embrace more than one subject, which shall be 
                                                 
1 Donald S. Lutz, Principles of Constitutional Design (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006) at 170. 
2 Ibid 179 n 16. 
3 See Richard Albert, “The Conventions of Constitutional Amendment in Canada” (2016) 53 Osgoode Hall L J 399, 
at 438-39. 
4 See Allan C. Hutchinson, “Constitutional Change and Constitutional Amendment: A Canadian Conundrum” in 
Xenophon Contiades, ed., Engineering Constitutional Change: A Comparative Perspective on Europe, Canada and 
the USA (Abington, UK: Routledge 2013) 51 at 57. 
RICHARD ALBERT             [3]     
 
FIRST DRAFT—COMMENTS WELCOME                                               SINGLE-SUBJECT CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS 
expressed in its title.” This new rule would prohibit omnibus amendment bills but it would 
nonetheless permit amending actors to vote on multiple amendment bills at the same time on the 
condition that each amendment bill were differentiated by subject-matter and voted on separately.  
 
This change to Part V of the Constitution Act, 1982 would not be without collateral 
consequence. Although it could make the Constitution much more flexible in some important 
ways, it could perhaps make it much more rigid in others, namely in the inability to comprehensive 
constitutional reforms. But transformative constitutional change is not without its problems, 
especially in our constitutional culture of evolutionary rather than revolutionary change. On this 
front, then, the moderating effect that a single-subject rule would bring could be both positive and 
consistent with the way the Canadian Constitution has evolved by accretion rather than convulsion. 
The more important consequence of amending the amending formula to entrench a single-subject 
rule for constitutional amendment implicates the role of courts: the battleground in constitutional 
amendment would ever after be whether a proposed amendment concerns one or more subjects. 
Political actors would have to rely on courts to interpret whether an amendment indeed focuses on 
only one subject or whether it violates the single-subject prohibition. This new judicial role in 
policing the single-subject rule could be worth the cost of a more readily amendable constitution.  
I. THE RIGIDITY OF THE LEGAL CONSTITUTION 
 
Recent failures in major constitutional reform have created the impression that it is impossible 
to amend the Canadian Constitution.5 This is a false intuition, however, belied by the reality that 
the Canadian Constitution has been amended nearly one dozen times since Patriation.6 Yet there 
is a kernel of truth in the myth of the impossibility of constitutional amendment in Canada: it is 
virtually impossible to imagine political actors somehow reaching agreement today on a package 
of major constitutional reforms amounting in scope to the failed Meech Lake or Charlottetown 
Accords. The reason why concerns the difficulty of amending Canada’s legal and political 
constitutions. The difficulty of amending the legal constitution in Canada—the legal constitution 
referring to those formally enacted and judicially enforceable parts of the Constitution—derives 
from the codified rules of constitutional amendment and the uncodified limitations on their use.7 
 
  
                                                 
5 See Adam Dodek, “Amending the Constitution: The Real Question Before the Supreme Court” (March/April 2014) 
Policy Magazine 35 at 36, online: http://policymagazine.ca/pdf/6/articles/PolicyMagazineMarch-April-Dodek.pdf 
(observing that “no one has dared to try” to amend the constitution because “the failed attempts of Meech Lake and 
Charlottetown serve as a powerful deterrent to those who would ponder the possibility embarking on constitutional 
change”). 
6 See Peter W Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 5th ed (Toronto: Carswell, 2007) (loose-leaf updated 2014, release 
1) vol 1 ch 1 at 1-7–1-8, n 32. 
7 Jamie Cameron develops the novel argument that there exists an additional source of formal amendment difficulty 
in Canada: “the rigidities associated with unresolved legitimacy deficits” that have accumulated and gone unresolved 
since Confederation. See Jamie Cameron, “Legality, Legitimacy and Constitutional Amendment in Canada” in 
Richard Albert & David R. Cameron, eds, Canada in the World: Comparative Perspectives on the Canadian 
Constitution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017) 98 at 122. 
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A. Part V of the Constitution Act, 1982 
 
There are five different paths to amend the legal constitution in Canada. Each amendment 
procedure is codified in the Constitution Act, 1982 and applies to different provisions or principles 
of the Constitution in an escalating structure of constitutional amendment.8 This structure is 
escalating because each procedure is more onerous than the other, the degree of amendment 
difficulty rising according to the importance of the amendable matter. These five procedures are 
something of a window into the internal hierarchy of the Constitution; we can describe the more 
deeply entrenched provisions and principles as more fundamental to the operation of the 
Constitution or alternatively to its core identity than the more loosely entrenches ones. 
 
For example, the least onerous amendment procedure authorizes a province to amend its own 
constitution by simple majority vote in its provincial assembly.9 A province can use this unilateral 
provincial procedure to amend any matter related to provincial government that is not otherwise 
entrenched under another amendment procedure.10 Parliament possesses an analogously limited 
power under the unilateral federal procedure, which authorizes narrow amendments to matters of 
federal executive and legislative government, subject to any overlap on matters of government that 
are themselves entrenched under a more onerous amendment procedure.11 The regional 
amendment procedure is more difficult than either of these two: it requires the agreement of both 
houses of Parliament and each of the assemblies of one or more regionally-concentrated provinces 
affected by the change.12 This third procedure applies to regional matters involving “one or more, 
but not all, provinces,” for instance a constitutional amendment involving provincial boundaries.13  
 
The next two are the default multilateral and the unanimity procedures. These are the ones that 
have combined to thwart the Meech Lake and Charlottetown Accords. The default multilateral 
amendment procedure—what is known as the general amending procedure—requires the approval 
of both houses of Parliament and at least seven provinces representing at least half of the total 
provincial population.14 It is both a default procedure and a mandatory one: it is the default 
procedure for any provision or principle not otherwise entrenched under one of the other four 
procedures; and it is the mandatory procedure for a handful of specifically enumerated matters, 
including the creation of new provinces as well as Senate vacancies, powers and representation.15 
This is a tough threshold to meet but it is not the hardest. The most onerous amendment procedure 
requires the unanimous agreement of both houses of Parliament and each provincial assembly.16 
This unanimity procedure must be used for any amendment to Canada’s relationship with the 
monarchy, the entire design of the formal amendment rules, provincial representation in the House 
of Commons and Senate, the use of English and French and the composition of the Supreme 
                                                 
8 See Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11, Part V [Constitution Act, 
1982]. 
9 Ibid, s 45. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Ibid, s 44. 
12 Ibid, s 43. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid, s 38. 
15 Ibid, s 42. 
16 Ibid, s 41. 
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Court.17 Each of the four federal procedures reflects an ascending scale of difficulty whose main 
variable is the provincial consent required: from none, to some, to supermajority and to unanimity. 
 
Despite the difficulties in measuring amendment difficulty,18 scholars have tried to measure 
the rigidity of the two most difficult amendment procedures in the Canadian Constitution. One 
study ranks Canada (7.0) behind only Belgium (9.5), Bolivia and the United States (9.0), the 
Netherlands (8.5) and Australia, Denmark and Japan (8.0).19 Another ranks Canada in a group of 
seven countries (Argentina, Australia, Canada, Germany, Japan, Korea, Switzerland and the 
United States) with the most rigid constitutions.20 Still another has used the metrics of a study that 
excluded Canada from its sample and found that, when applied to Canada, those metrics suggest 
that Canada’s Constitution may be second most difficult constitution to amend in the world.21 A 
clear pattern emerges: the Constitution of Canada is at or near the very top in terms of rigidity. 
 
B. Uncodified Amendment Rules 
 
As difficult at these codified procedures make it to amend the most important features of the 
Canadian Constitution, there are uncodified restrictions on their use that make the Constitution 
even more difficult to amend than a plain reading of its formal amendment rules suggests. These 
uncodified restrictions have their origins in judicial interpretation as well as statutes passed by 
Parliament and provincial assemblies. They are uncodified because they are found outside the four 
corners of the codified constitution. Yet they are nonetheless legal because political actors could 
seek to enforce them in court—unlike the political restrictions I discuss in the next Part. 
 
Begin with the provinces and territories.22 Many of them have passed laws that require the 
jurisdiction to hold either a binding or advisory referendum before the assembly votes on an 
amendment on which its assent is needed. Both Alberta and British Columbia have adopted laws 
requiring a binding provincial referendum before their respective assemblies vote to ratify or reject 
an amendment.23 Some provinces—and territories as well—have adopted laws that authorize but 
do not require binding referendums before a vote on whether to ratify an amendment.24 Provinces 
and territories have also adopted laws that authorize but do not require advisory referendums 
                                                 
17 Ibid. The last three matters amendable using the unanimity procedure must be distinguished from related but lesser 
matters amendable by another one of the five procedures. Ibid. 
18 See Tom Ginsburg & James Melton, “Does the Constitutional Amendment Rule Matter at All? Amendment Cultures 
and the Challenges of Measuring Amendment Difficulty” (2015) 13 Int’l J Constitutional L 686. 
19 See Astrid Lorenz, “How to Measure Constitutional Rigidity: Four Concepts and Two Alternatives” (2005) 17 J 
Theoretical Politics 339 at 358-59. 
20 See Arend Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2012) at 208. 
21 See Richard Albert, “The Difficulty of Constitutional Amendment in Canada” (2015) 53 Alberta L Rev 85 at 93-
100. 
22 Note that the territories have no formal role in the two most onerous amendment procedures yet, as I will discuss 
below, they may have a conventional claim to future participation in major constitutional amendments. See infra 
Section II.A. 
23 See Constitutional Referendum Act, RSA 2000, c C-25, ss 2(1), 4; Constitutional Amendment Approval Act, RSBC 
1996, c 67, s 1; Referendum Act, RSBC 1996, c 400, s 4. 
24 See Referendum Act, SNB 2011, c 23, ss 12–13 (establishing quorum requirement for vote to bind government); 
The Referendum and Plebiscite Act, SS 1990-91, c R-8.01, s 4 (establishing quorum and threshold requirements for 
vote to bind government); Public Government Act, SY 1992, c-10, s 7 (authorizing provincial assembly to decide ex 
ante whether referendum vote will bind government). 
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before voting to ratify or to reject an constitutional amendment.25 These laws make it harder to 
amend the Constitution because they add additional actors whose consent is required for a change. 
 
Parliament has likewise passed a major statute that complicates any future constitutional 
amendment attempted under the default multilateral amendment procedure. The Regional Veto 
Law, passed in 1996, prohibits federal cabinet ministers from proposing an amendment under that 
procedure without first securing the consent of a majority of provinces, where that majority must 
include British Columbia, Ontario, Quebec, and at least two provinces each from the Atlantic and 
Prairie regions whose population amounts to at least half of the regional population.26 This law 
operates as a prior restraint on an amendment proposal; rather than proposing an amendment that 
might over time gather the necessary support after public debate, now the federal government must 
front-load the process by getting the consent of provinces before even proposing an amendment. 
 
The Supreme Court of Canada has also exacerbated Canada’s constitutional rigidity. The 
Constitution’s formal amendment rules are clear in their plain text: amendments to “the 
composition of the Supreme Court of Canada” may be made only using the unanimity procedure.27  
Other major amendments to the Supreme Court may be made using the default multilateral 
amendment procedure.28 But the Court basically amended the Constitution when it added its own 
“essential features” to the list of items that are amendable only with recourse to the unanimity 
procedure. In the Supreme Court Act Reference, the Court held that “the Court’s jurisdiction as the 
final general court of appeal for Canada, including in matters of constitutional interpretation, and 
its independence”29 may be amended only using the unanimity procedure.30  
 
The Secession Reference is another example: the Court held that any amendment to formalize 
the separation of a province from Canada must respect the duty to negotiate and five “underlying 
constitutional principles,” namely federalism, democracy, constitutionalism, the rule of law, and 
respect for minority rights.31 The two references are similar insofar as the Court imposed new 
restrictions on constitutional amendment—restrictions that are nowhere identified in the codified 
Constitution—and more importantly the Court cast the new restrictions in broad, open-textured 
terms that will require elaboration by the Court itself in the event of a constitutional challenge. The 
point is not that the Court was right or wrong in how it interpreted the Constitution; it is much less 
provocatively that the Court made difficult amendment rules even more difficult in these two cases. 
 
                                                 
25 See e.g. Consolidation of Plebiscite Act, RSNWT 19888, c P-8, s 5; Elections and Plebiscites Act, SNWT 2006, c 
15, s 48; La Loi sur la consultation populaire, LRQ 2000, c C-64.1, s 7; Plebiscites Act, RSPEI 1988, c P-10, s 1. See 
also Elections Act, SNL 1992, c E-3.1, s 218 (authorizing non-binding plebiscite on federal amendment). 
26 An Act Respecting Constitutional Amendments, SC 1996, c 1 [Regional Veto Law]. 
27 Constitution Act, 1982, supra note 8, s 41(d). 
28 Ibid, s 42(d). 
29 Reference re Supreme Court Act, ss 5 and 6, [2014] 1 SCR 433 at para 94 [Supreme Court Act Reference]. Warren 
Newman explored the Court’s constitutional status—and the possibility that the Supreme Court Act might not be 
amendable by a simple statute—five years prior to the Supreme Court Act Reference. See Warren J Newman, “The 
Constitutional Status of the Supreme Court of Canada” (2009) 47 Sup Ct L Rev (2d) 429.  
30 Ibid, paras 90-105. 
31 Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 SCR 217 [Secession Reference]. 
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II. THE RIGIDITY OF THE POLITICAL CONSTITUTION 
 
As difficult as it is to satisfy the legal requirements to amend the Constitution of Canada, there 
are also political requirements for constitutional amendment. These are not formally enacted nor 
are they ordinarily enforced by courts. Political requirements in constitutional amendment are 
instead the judicially unenforceable practices and conventions that inform and sometimes govern 
the conduct of political actors. They are not codified in the Constitution but they may perhaps have 
constitution-level effect, namely in the case of political practices that have matured into judicially 
recognizable constitutional conventions of constitutional amendment. 
 
A. The Charlottetown Precedent 
 
There are two significant political precedents that complicate amendments to Canada’s legal 
Constitution. Both emerged from the failed Charlottetown Accord in 1992. The first is the use of 
a national referendum—formally advisory but in reality functionally binding—in the course of the 
process of ratifying a major constitutional amendment. And the second is the involvement of 
territories in the ratification process, even though Part V makes no mention of their participation. 
If either of these is treated as precedential the next time a major constitutional amendment is 
proposed, this will raise the degree of difficulty for amending the Constitution of Canada. 
 
The formal rules of constitutional amendment in Canada do not require any form of direct 
popular participation in any part of initiating, proposing or ratifying an amendment.32 And yet 
political actors made the choice to put the Charlottetown Accord to a referendum. They felt 
compelled to use the referendum in light of justified complaints about the close-door process of 
elite executive federalism that had been used to design and negotiate the Meech Lake Accord, 
which had failed just a couple of years before the Charlottetown Accord was put to a vote.33 The 
referendum was authorized by a new Referendum Act, passed by Parliament to allow a referendum 
“on any question relating to the Constitution of Canada”.34 The law was clear that any outcome 
would be advisory, not legally binding. But the political reality at the time and likely still today is 
such that political actors would treat the result as an instruction on how to proceed: a convincing 
yes vote would make political actors follow suit the same way that a convincing no vote would 
preclude any further action on the amendment. Canadians rejected the Charlottetown Accord by 
almost 10 percentage points, 54.3 to 45.7 percent, putting an end to the amendment effort.35  
 
Not only do the rules of formal amendment make no mention of a referendum but they do not 
give territories a role in constitutional amendment. And yet both territories at the time—the 
Northwest Territories and Yukon—voted in the national referendum. As it happens, one territory 
voted to approve the Accord and the other to reject.36 But both occupied a role equal to that of the 
provinces despite there being no constitutional requirement to count the territories in the process. 
                                                 
32 See Procedure for Amending Constitution of Canada, Part V of the Constitution Act, 1982. 
33 There were of course also serious criticisms about the content of the Meech Lake Accord. See Peter J Meekison, 
“The Meech Lake Accord: The End of the Beginning—or the Beginning of the End” (1990) 1 Const Forum 13 at 14. 
34 Referendum Act, s 3(1), SC 1992, c 30. 
35 See The 1992 Federal Referendum—A Challenge Met: Report of the Chief Electoral Officer of Canada, Part 2, at 
58, January 17, 1994, online: <http://www.elections.ca/res/rep/off/1992/1992_Referendum_Part_2_E.pdf>. 
36 Ibid. 
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Like the choice to put the Charlottetown Accord to a referendum, the choice to give the territories 
a vote was driven not by legal obligation but by what were seen as justifiable political imperatives. 
 
It is unclear whether one or the other amounts to a constitutional convention. Were the question 
to reach the Court, the justices would likely again use the Jennings test to identify whether or not 
a convention exists—a test the Supreme Court used in the Patriation Reference.37 The test consists 
of three requirements for taking judicial notice of the existence of a convention: 
 
We have to ask ourselves three questions: first, what are the precedents; secondly, 
did the actors in the precedents believe that they were bound by a rule; and thirdly, 
is there a reason for the rule? A single precedent with a good reason may be enough 
to establish the rule. A whole string of precedents without such a reason will be of 
no avail, unless it is perfectly certain that the persons concerned regarded them as 
bound by it.38 
 
We could well construct an argument in defense of either or both precedents having matured into 
a constitutional convention. Yet the right answer seems to be that we quite simply will not know 
whether a convention exists until political actors in the future face a decision on whether to hold a 
referendum in connection with a major constitutional amendment. The Court can of course 
evaluate the question for itself as it did in the Patriation Reference but its opinion will be advisory 
not binding, and it will be unable to enforce its judgment since for now conventions in Canada are 
enforceable only in the political arena not in the courts of law. But the larger point for our purposes 
is that if political actors were to treat these two Charlottetown precedents as conventionally 
binding, this would make amending the Constitution even harder than it is today—and these 
aggravating conditions would derive from Canada’s political constitution, not its legal constitution. 
 
B. Omnibus Amendment Packages 
 
The political practice that perhaps most complicates constitutional amendment in Canada is 
the choice to propose major constitutional reforms as an omnibus package of amendments. The 
1987 Meech Lake and 1992 Charlottetown Accords each proposed multiple alterations to the 
Constitution, and in both cases the proposals were bundled together in one enormous constitutional 
amendment. The inspiration for these omnibus amendment packages was the 1981 Patriation 
package, which introduced the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, entrenched a fully domestic set 
of formal amendment rules, consolidated the many parts of the Constitution, and ended the United 
Kingdom’s legal authority in Canada, though it did keep the ceremonial trappings of the monarchy.  
 
The Meech Lake and Charlottetown Accords sought to make momentous changes of their 
own. The principal purpose of the Meech Lake Accord was to reconcile Quebec with the rest of 
Canada after Patriation left many in Quebec with misgivings about both the agreement and the 
way it had been negotiated and ultimately finalized. The Accord was designed to address Quebec’s 
five conditions for accepting the Constitution Act, 1982.39 These changes would have been 
formalized as amendments to both the Constitution Act, 1867 and the Constitution Act, 1982. The 
                                                 
37 Reference re Resolution to Amend the Constitution, [1981] 1 SCR 753, 888 [Patriation Reference]. 
38 Ivor Jennings, The Law and the Constitution (London, UK: University of London Press, 5th ed. 1959) at 136. 
39 See Peter W Hogg, Meech Lake Constitutional Accord Annotated (Carswell, 1988) at 3-4. 
RICHARD ALBERT             [9]     
 
FIRST DRAFT—COMMENTS WELCOME                                               SINGLE-SUBJECT CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS 
Accord proposed, for instance, to constitutionalize a declaration that “Quebec constitutes within 
Canada a distinct society,”40 to change the method of senatorial selection to give provinces an 
important role in the choice,41 to give provinces some control over immigration,42 to 
constitutionalize the Supreme Court,43 and to require the prime minister to convene a conference 
of first ministers at least once per year.44 The Meech Lake Accord also proposed to amend the 
formal amendment rules themselves.45 These were some of the major features of the Accord. 
 
The Charlottetown Accord was just as extensive in the changes it sought to make. The Accord 
proposed once again to recognize the distinctiveness of Quebec,46 yet it also proposed to entrench 
a “Canada Clause” that would recognize the values that bind Canadians across country.47 The 
Accord would have also recognized Aboriginal rights,48 clarified and in some ways reorganized 
the federal distribution of powers,49 made significant changes to the Senate and the House of 
Commons as well as to the Supreme Court,50 brought additional protections for linguistic rights,51 
and it too would have amended the rules of formal amendment.52 The Accord moreover would 
have entrenched a requirement of an annual conference of first ministers.53 Just like the Meech 
Lake Accord, then, the Charlottetown Accord proposed a series of substantial amendments. 
 
Both packages were patterned after Patriation—many changes were built into one 
amendment—but there is an important difference between Patriation on the one hand and the 
Meech Lake and Charlottetown Accords on the other: the method of ratification. Patriation was an 
agreement among elites with no direct involvement from voters, nor was the agreement agreed to 
by parliamentarians. It was instead an agreement among the Government of Canada and the 
governments of nine of the ten provinces, Quebec being the only province to refuse its assent.54 
The packages involved in Meech Lake and Charlottetown were to be ratified with the involvement 
of voters and parliamentarians; the Meech Lake Accord was to be ratified in votes of the provincial 
assemblies and the Charlottetown Accord also in provincial votes after the advisory referendum. 
 
The method of ratification is the predicate for why the Meech Lake and Charlottetown 
Accords were doomed almost as soon as they were bundled as omnibus amendment packages. The 
method of ratification raised three problems: the problem of veto gates, the problem of 
incommensurability and the problem of comprehensiveness. Unlike at Patriation where there were 
only a small number of 11 major decisionmakers to convince—and even still the assent of all 11 
                                                 
40 Meech Lake Accord, at Schedule s 1. 
41 Ibid at Schedule s 2. 
42 Ibid at Schedule s 3. 
43 Ibid at Schedule s 6. 
44 Ibid at Schedule s 8. 
45 Ibid at Schedule s 9. 
46 Charlottetown Accord, at IA1. 
47 Ibid.  
48 Ibid at IA2, IV. 
49 Ibid at IB, III.  
50 Ibid at IIA-C. 
51 Ibid at IA3. 
52 Ibid at IV. 
53 Ibid at IID. 
54 The agreement was formalized as a statute of the Parliament of the United Kingdom. See Canada Act 1982, 1982 c 
11. 
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was not required—here in Meech and Charlottetown the decisionmakers were multiplied many 
times over and presented many more veto opportunities to kill the reform efforts. The bigger 
problem, though, was that some of various proposals within the same amendment package were 
in tension with each other in the sense that some groups certainly were pleased with the gains 
promised to them but they opposed some of the concessions offered to others.55 As Louis 
Massicotte has explained, there was a logic behind the omnibus strategy in constitutional reform: 
 
Documents like the Victoria Charter, the final patriation deal, the Meech Lake and 
Charlottetown Accords were all based on the assumption that nobody would be 
satisfied by each facet of the deal if considered in isolation, but that we should try 
to include in the package a little something for everybody, so as to generate a 
minimal consensus, if not genuine enthusiasm for the whole package.56 
 
Voting in favour of the reforms therefore meant taking the bitter with the sweet, which is not out 
of the ordinary in the normal course of legislative logrolling. The difference here was that a 
concession given to one group undermined the victory sought by another group. A third problem 
was a function of the comprehensiveness of the reform packages. Almost every important part of 
the Constitution was in some way touched by the reform proposals. The sheer volume of proposed 
changes itself was a significant problem—and the cause of the defeat of both reform packages—
because it was not hard to find something to oppose. With few if any groups fully satisfied with 
what Canada would look like after the implementation of an Accord, most saw better reason to 
oppose the reforms than to depart from the known but nonetheless imperfect status quo. 
III. A SINGLE-SUBJECT RULE FOR CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT 
 
There may be a way out of our constitutional amendment gridlock. A single-subject rule for 
constitutional amendment would prevent the use of omnibus bills for amendments and would 
instead require political actors to propose individual amendments that focus on one subject alone. 
This new single-subject rule would compel amending actors to consider every single amendment 
on its own merits, with a distinguishable vote on each proposed change. No longer would 
amendments be bundled together in a package of changes unrelated to each other except insofar 
as they all concern the Canadian Constitution. We would know clearly where each amending actor 
stands on the amendment proposal. Although omnibus amendment bills would be prohibited, 
amending actors could still vote on multiple amendment bills at the same time on the condition 
that each amendment bill were differentiated by subject-matter and voted on separately. This new 
single-subject rule would be inserted into Part V of the Constitution Act, 1982 and would require 
that “no amendment shall embrace more than one subject, which shall be expressed in its title.” 
 
A. The Single-Subject Rule 
 
The debate on the use and abuse of omnibus bills is not new in Canada. As early as 1923, 
Hansard recorded objections to the Act respecting the Construction of the Canadian National 
                                                 
55 Richard Johnston, “An Inverted Logroll: The Charlottetown Accord and the Referendum” (1993) 26 Pol Sci & Pol 
43 at 43. 
56 Louis Massicotte, “Omnibus Bills in Theory and Practice” (2013) 36 Can Parl Rev 13 at 15. 
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Railway Lines, which proposed to build 29 branch lines. 57 Parliamentarians suggested that the bill 
should be reintroduced as separate bills for each line; and indeed in the next session the government 
did just that.58 More recently, the Chrétien government made use of omnibus budget bills that grew 
from 63 pages in 1994 to 380 in 2003; the Martin government’s 2005 budget counted 450 pages.59 
By 2010, the Harper government had proposed an 880-page omnibus budget bill.60 This practice 
of cramming disparate items into one bill has been decried as an “affront to parliamentary 
democracy”61 and as a devices that “subvert and evade the normal principles of parliamentary 
review of legislation.”62 Omnibus bills may of course expedite voting and implementation but 
there is a strong case that they undermine our overarching values of democracy and accountability 
insofar as they do not allow parliamentarians to vote for or against specific items within them. 
 
Taking a larger view of legislative practice, one can appreciate the purpose of the single-
subject rule. It is partly intended to prevent log-rolling, which occurs when legislators occupying 
separate minority blocks combine their own proposals as different parts of one bill in order to 
consolidate their separate minority votes into a working majority to pass the mega-bill whose 
individual parts might not have otherwise attracted majority support if voted on separately.63 The 
single-subject rule also prevents political actors from attaching “riders” to a popular bill in order 
to ensure the adoption of the rider without considered judgment on it alone but on the strength of 
the larger bill in which it is placed.64 The rule also simplifies the complicated legislative process: 
it requires debate on individual legislative proposals on their own merits and this generates a more 
informed and direct debate on the stakes involved in approving the measure.65 The rule therefore 
has a democratic pedigree insofar as it serves the public interests of accessibility to legislative 
business, information on what representatives do, and accountability for how representatives vote. 
 
B. Design and Implementation Challenges 
 
Discontinuing the use of omnibus bills is a topic of current debate, and it may well happen. 
In its 2015 electoral platform, the Liberal Party pledged to “bring an end to this undemocratic 
practice.”66 If the practice is undemocratic in one case surely it must be in others. There is little 
                                                 
57 Michel Bédard, Omnibus Bills: Frequently Asked Questions, Library of Parliament, Legal and Legislative Affairs 
Division, Publication No 2012-79-E, October 1, 2012, at 2. 
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that distinguishes an omnibus legislative bill from an omnibus amendment bill. The principal point 
of distinction—that one targets ordinary law and the other constitutional law—makes the case even 
stronger in the case of constitutional amendment since these bills are intended to change the land’s 
highest law, and if anything should attract exacting scrutiny it is an alteration to the Constitution. 
 
There is reason to believe that only omnibus amendment bills could ever lead to successful 
constitutional reform in Canada. For example, the idea of a “Triple E” Senate—making the Senate 
elected, equal and effective—was crucial to western Canada’s support for the Charlottetown 
package but this reform was not acceptable to either Ontario or Quebec without the west’s 
agreement to making other changes that Ontario and Quebec wanted but that the west might not.67 
And so this trade led to other trades, which in turn led to trades involving other parties and interests, 
and by the end of negotiations the Charlottetown package was full of compromises that could not 
stand on their own. Only when cobbled together in an unsteady state could the entire package have 
had any chance at approval. But even then the prospects for ratification were far from reassuring. 
 
The better view may be that comprehensive constitutional reform on this scale might for now 
and quite possibly forever be impossible in Canada. Michael Lusztig has theorized that Canada’s 
various “mega-constitutional orientations” are inherently irreconcilable, the consequence being 
that major amendment efforts are doomed to failure.68 He identifies four conflicting mega-
constitutional orientations—pan-Canadian, Quebec, Western and minoritarian—that give a 
different answer to the question where sovereign lies.69 Three pairs of answers are possible, 
according to Lusztig: with individuals or collectivities; if with collectivities, with territorial ones 
or nonterritorial ones, and if with territorial collectivities, with symmetrical or assymetrical 
arrangements?70 In light of these competing visions of sovereignty in Canada, Lusztig concludes 
that the modern political imperative for mass input and legitimization in major constitutional 
reforms like the Meech Lake and Charlottetown Accords does not bode well for the successful 
ratification of amendment packages in a deeply divided consociationalist system like ours.71  
 
Rather than pursuing major constitutional reforms on the comprehensive scale of the Meech 
Lake or Charlottetown Accords, a more realistic objective is to seek incremental changes 
constrained by a single-subject rule. Amending actors could then tailor amendment bills to address 
specific problems one item at a time in a piecemeal fashion, and require votes on each. Amending 
actors would be expected to declare themselves on each proposed change on its own merits. To be 
sure, the single-subject rule would not solve the problem of irreconcilability that Lusztig identifies; 
if Lusztig is right, that problem will never disappear. The single-subject rule would instead 
contemplates an altogether different path that circumvents this problem. The new path of a single-
subject rule for constitutional amendment would have the anticipated effect of moderating reforms 
from the comprehensive kind we saw in the Meech Lake and Charlottetown Accords to more 
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targeted changes that do not involve the complex web of interconnected and unconnected changes 
that have failed in the past. Even if the single-subject rule did not in the end yield amendments 
with greater success than is possible today with omnibus amendment bills, the single-subject rule 
would have the benefit of requiring amending actors to vote yes or no on each discrete amendment. 
 
The single-subject rule would moreover neutralize the familiar boogeyman that political 
actors often invoke to end discussions on constitutional reform before they even begin: the problem 
of “re-opening” the Constitution. It is an effective deterrent to threaten that constitutional talks 
would put everything on the negotiating table, with nothing assured of surviving negotiations on 
a package of constitutional reforms. Where the choice is either the status quo or a bundle of 
changes unknown in their content or consequence, the prudent decision is to opt for the familiar 
present arrangements, however imperfect. The single-subject rule would obviate the fear of 
wholesale constitutional overhaul by taking off the table as a possibility permissible under law. 
 
Yet the almost-certain consequence of adopting a single-subject rule for constitutional 
amendment would involve the judiciary: the Supreme Court would take on an even bigger role in 
managing the process of constitutional reform.72 The Court is already integrally involved today in 
constitutional amendment when it evaluates whether a amendment would be constitutional even 
before it is proposed, as we saw in the Senate Reform Reference.73 But with the single-subject rule, 
the Court would now be called upon using the reference procedure to determine whether a given 
amendment conforms to the requirement that it concern only a “single subject”. We have seen state 
courts in the United States exercise the judicial review power to determine what constitutes one 
subject for purposes of amendment, using standards like “germaneness” and “common purpose” 
to test whether a package of amendments relates to a single subject.74 We have even seen courts 
apply the severability doctrine to excise parts of bills deemed unrelated to the central subject75—
a problematic choice that courts would do best to avoid if confronted with it.76 Potentially, then, 
the single-subject rule would have implications far beyond the amending actors alone. 
CONCLUSION—THE DEMOCRATIC VALUES OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT 
 
For a country without the present capacity to make major constitutional amendments, Canada 
is performing spectacularly well in a variety of quality of life rankings that are no doubt more 
important. Canada ranks among the world’s top ten countries on the United Nation’s Human 
Development Index, which aggregates outcomes for life expectancy, education and gross national 
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income.77 The country ranks sixth on the globe in The Economist’s Democracy Index, a measure 
of the integrity of governance, democratic outcomes, civil rights and political culture.78 And 
Canada ranks also sixth in the World Happiness Report, a global ranking of happiness.79 So 
perhaps it matters little or not at all that Canadians cannot today amend our Constitution. 
 
Do we even need a formal amendment process? After all, we have a highly regarded, trusted 
and capable judiciary, led by the Supreme Court of Canada, that can change our Constitution by 
interpretation where needed in order to keep it reflective of the times.80 The reality of informal 
amendment by judicial interpretation is ever more present since the 2014 Senate Reform and 
Supreme Court Act References, which, taken together lead us to the incontrovertible conclusion 
that the Court now possesses the immense power to determine whether, how and by whom the 
Constitution of Canada can be amended, even where the amendment concerns the Court itself.81 
 
Yet there is something special about the collective act of formally amending a constitution, 
whether it is done directly by referendum, as is the case relatively frequently in Ireland and 
Switzerland, or indirectly through representative institutions, as our own constitution requires. 
However constitutional democracies design their formal amendment rules—and they exist in all 
but a handful of world’s codified constitutions82—formal amendment rules serve important 
functions. They provide a roadmap for amending actors to alter the constitutional text,83 and they 
distinguish constitutional from ordinary law.84 More importantly they serve fundamental 
democratic values of participation, deliberation and ownership. At their best they promote 
deliberation about constitutional meaning,85 they channel popular will into institutional dialogue,86 
and they formalize an important right of citizens in a democracy—to amend their constitution.87 
 
                                                 
77 United Nations Development Program, Human Development Report 2016: Human Development for Everyone (New 
York, NY: United Nations Development Program, 2016) at 198. 
78 The Economist Intelligence Unit, Democracy Index 2016: Revenge of the “Deplorables” (2017) at 7. 
79 John F Helliwell et al, eds, World Happiness Report 2016 (New York: Sustainable Development Solutions Network, 
2016) at 20. 
80 The reality of informal amendment by judicial interpretation is not without its critics. See eg, Dennis Baker & Mark 
D Jarvis, “The End of Informal Constitutional Change in Canada?” in Emmett Macfarlane, ed, Constitutional 
Amendment in Canada (Toronto: Toronto University Press, 2016) at 185; Dale Gibson, “Founding Fathers-in-Law: 
Judicial Amendment of the Canadian Constitution” (1992) 55 L & Contemp Probs 261. 
81 See Richard Albert, “The Most Powerful Court in the World? Constitutional Amendment in Canada After the Senate 
Reform and Supreme Court Act References”, paper prepared for conference on the Sesquicentennial at the Asper 
Center, University of Toronto Faculty of Law; see also Emmett Macfarlane, “Unsteady Architecture: Ambiguity, the 
Senate Reference, and the Future of Constitutional Amendment in Canada” (2015) 60 McGill LJ 883 at 903 
(suggesting that the Senate Reform Reference “may have the effect of chilling future attempts at constitutional change 
or, at the very least, increasing contestation and future legal challenges to reform efforts”). 
82 See Francesco Giovannoni, “Amendment Rules in Constitutions” (2003) 115 Pub. Choice 37 at 37. 
83 Rosalind Dixon & Richard Holden, “Constitutional Amendment Rules: The Denominator Problem” in Tom 
Ginsburg, ed., Comparative Constitutional Design (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012) 195 at 195. 
84 András Sajó, Limiting Government: An Introduction to Constitutionalism (Budapest: Central European University 
Press, 1999) at 39-40. 
85 Raymond Ku, “Consensus of the Governed: The Legitimacy of Constitutional Change” (1995) 64 Fordham L Rev 
535 at 571. 
86 Walter Dellinger, “The Legitimacy of Constitutional Change: Rethinking the Amendment Process” (1983) 97 Harv 
L Rev 386 at 431. 
87 Jed Rubenfeld, Freedom and Time: A Theory of Constitutional Self-Government (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 2001) at 174. 
RICHARD ALBERT             [15]     
 
FIRST DRAFT—COMMENTS WELCOME                                               SINGLE-SUBJECT CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS 
It is not enough that the Constitution is freely amendable using only three of the five 
procedures entrenched in the Constitution Act, 1982 because these procedures—the unilateral 
provincial procedure, the unilateral federal procedure and the regional procedure—are useable 
only to amend a small part of the Constitution of Canada in relation to what is amendable using 
the other two currently unuseable ones. The multilateral default procedure and the unanimity 
procedure are today blocked because they are virtually impossible to use. The reasons why derive 
of course from the legal rigidity of the Constitution—the initiation requirements, ratification 
thresholds and the time limits associated with them. But the larger reason why neither procedure 
is useable may well derive from non-legal sources of the Constitution’s rigidity, the most important 
being the choice made to package both the Meech Lake and Charlottetown Accords as omnibus 
amendment bills. When we speak today of major constitutional amendments, we look back to those 
spectacular amendment failures and assume that the same fate awaits us for future large-scale 
amendment efforts. But this need not necessarily continue to be the outcome. 
 
I have suggested that major constitutional amendment may become possible if we adopt a 
single-subject rule for constitutional amendment. This new single-subject rule would be inserted 
into Part V of the Constitution Act, 1982 and would require that “no amendment shall embrace 
more than one subject, which shall be expressed in its title.” This single-subject rule would prevent 
the use of omnibus bills for constitutional amendments. It would require amending actors to 
propose individual amendments that concern one subject alone. It would moreover demand that 
every single amendment be considered on its own merits. Amending actors could no longer bundle 
amendments in an enormous package of changes unrelated to each other except insofar as they all 
concern the Canadian Constitution. Importantly, the prohibition on omnibus amendment bills 
would not prevent amending actors from proposing and voting on multiple amendment bills at the 
same time—on the condition that each amendment bill were differentiated by subject-matter and 
voted on separately. This single-subject rule could well lead us to an affirmative answer to the 
question that we have answered in the negative for over a generation: will we ever find a way to 
finally make a much needed major constitutional amendment to the Constitution of Canada? 
